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This paper is intended as a critical review of the usefulness of
"cultural differences in defining the nature of information processing
activities individuals may use in their role as consumers. Of parti-
cular interest are those cognitive behaviors by which an individual
collects , integrates and evaluates information relevant to a decision
among competing alternatives. Is there any reason, based on existing
empirical evidence, to believe that these judgmental activities will
systematically differ across cultural groups? If so, in what ways
might v;e expect them to differ, and under what conditions? Since
"culture" and "information processing" are broad labels subject to
varieties of interpretation, the limits of this review should be defined.
The concept of "culture" is quite elusive; there is little consensus
on how to operationally distinguish one culture from another. Conse-
quently, no unique definition will be proposed to guide the review.
Instead, the domain of research reviewed will encompass all work
relevant to the topic of information processing defined by the re-
searchers themselves as cross-cultural, or involving comparisons
between groups distinguished by any of the demographic dimensions
commonly associated with "culture" (or "subculture"). These may include
nationality, geographic location, social class, race, etc. (Although
this definitional problem will be momentarily sidestepped to expedite
the review, its relevance to the basic question under examination cannot
be so easily dismissed, and it will return to haunt us.)
Three major areas of research will be covered: (1) research relating
cultural differences to problem solving strategies
,
including work on
«I
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the subjective treatment of time and on abstract reasoning; (2) research
linking culture with personality traits which are also related to informa-
tion processing differences (e.g., locus of control, risk-taking pro-
pensity); and (3) research dealing with the unique evaluative systems
found in different cultures.

Problem Solving Processes
Problem solving processes as defined here, encompass the chain of
cognitive activities through which an individual marshalls evidence
about the consequences of alternate courses of action, integrates the
evidence, generates hypotheses about future events, and chooses some
"optimal" strategy for attaining whatever configuration of outcomes seems
ideal to him. A number of diverse streams of cross-cultural research
have dealt with different portions of this process, although attempts to
rigorously examine the decision strategies of individuals on a cross-
cultural basis have been rare.
Subjective Time
Time and timing enter into an individuals 's information processing
activities in a variety of ways. In order to explore evidence of cul-
tural differences in the subjective treatment of time, three conceptually
distinct areas in which time enters into the decision process should be
distinguished: (1) the amount of time between the point where an indi-
vidual begins to analyze an impending decision problem and the point at
which he anticipates having to make the final decision (his "planning
horizon")
; (2) the amount of time a person anticipates will separate the
making of the choice and the reception of consequent penalties and re-
wards; and (3) the amount of time a person is willing to invest in actual
information processing activity relative to a choice problem. Each of
these three time-related variables has received some attention in cross-
cultural research.

The findings have almost uniformly indicated that members of dis-
advantaged subcultures encounter difficulties when they try to concep-
tually handle temporal sequences of events which extend very far into
the future. Thus members of culturally deprived social groups have been
described by an inability to engage in future-oriented planning or to
establish long term goals as a basis for their planning (Leshan, 1952;
Gray and Klaus, 1965; Hertzig, 1971; Meade, 1968). Meade (1968) demon-
strated that differences in time perspective could be found between stu-
dents in the United States (longer horizons) and students in India
(shorter horizons). Mehta, et al. (1972) could not, however, find evi-
dence of such differences. Meade (1972) shed some light on the discre-
pancy by showing that differences in planning horizon are apparently con-
fined to certain Indian sects; the planning horizons of the Kshatriya,
Sikh, and Parsee sects appear comparable to those found in the United
States. (Where to stop segmenting into defining more and more "subcul-
tures" is a continuing problem throughout cross-cultural research.)
Closely related to the short planning horizons associated with cul-
turally disadvantaged subcultures is an apparent inability to delay grati-
fication (Mischel, 1966; Gray and Klaus, 1965; Cole, 1972). Members of
the disadvantaged subculture apparently find it more difficult to decide a
tradeoff between a larger delayed rex\rard and a smaller immediate reward
in favor of the former. There is little to Indicate whether (a) the un-
certainty caused by a person's inability to conceptually handle distant
events induces the choice of the clear and immediate reward or (b) the
motivation to enjoy the reward now (while he can) induces him to forego

the effort of long-term planning.
Several studies have also reported that subjects from lower class
subcultures tended to be more impulsive in judgment tasks (i.e., to
reach closure faster) than their middle class peers (Kagan, 1971; Hess
and Shipman, 1965) . Kagan (1971) marshalls evidence to suggest that this
impulsiveness is accompanied by relatively less concern over the possibility
of failing to make the correct choice.
The picture that emerges from the existing research seems to portray
the disadvantaged consumer as tending to engage in very quick bursts of
information processing activity only as the need to make the choice commit-
ment becomes imminent. Long run rev-zard- penalty dimensions of the problem
are not particularly salient and these dimensions tend to drop out of the
individual's evaluative equation.
Abstract Reasoning
Difficulty in generating hypotheses about future events may be re-
lated to a difficulty in thinking in abstract terms. Not surprisingly,
research on cultural deficit has focused on differences in the concrete-
abstract dimension. The abundance of research substantiating the concrete
nature of the thought processes displayed by disadvantaged, unschooled,
"primitive" subcultures lends high credibility to the existence of such
a difference. For example, Piagetian research has found general support
for the notion of stages of cognitive development differing in the abstract-
ness of the reasoning concepts used. The rates of progression and ultimate
attainment level have differed substantially across subcultures (Dasen,

1972> Cryns (1962) , Greenfield and Bruner <1966^nnd Deutsch (1967) all indicate
that disadvantaged subcultures show less of a tendency to engage in abstract
reasoning. As described by Bruner (1970), this involves an inability to
go beyond the objects, people, or events immediately present in one's
thinking or language usage. Concrete reasoning does not deal with hy-
pothetical possibilities or hypothetical plans. One universal finding
has been that cultures characterized by attendance at "Western" schools
tend to promote the development of abstract problem solving skills by
forcing students to learn to solve problems involving things which are not
present at the time, (Bruner, Oliver and Greenfield, 1966; Goodnow, 1969;
Price-Williams, Gordon, and Ramirez, 1969). Since projections into the
future necessarily entail handling hypothetical events, limited time hori-
zons in decision making should be a corollary to relatively concrete cog-
nitive development.
Concreteness in problem solving among minority subcultures has several
implications. For example, extrinsic rewards (rewards which are tangible
or take the form of observable approval from others) have been shown to be
more motivating than intrinsic rewards (rewards where satisfaction depends
on internal imagination or abstraction) V7ith lower-class children and vice-
versa with middle class children (Havighurst, 1970; Zigler and Child, 1969).
Levi-Strauss (1966) has emphasized that, while basic problem-solving acti-
vities (classifying, ordering, logical thinking) are probably common across
cultures, the kinds of attributes used in forming classes differ markedly.
"Primitive" individuals rely heavily on properties readily seen or sen-
sually experienced in categorizing objects while advanced or "scientific"
I
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classification systems rely more on properties vjhich are inferred. In
solving problems, someone using such a "primitive" type system would be
constrained by his own concrete experience (or that of his community) and
unable to generalize or make inferences beyond that experience. Jensen
(1969) has proposed that inherent differences in conceptual learning a-
bility may exist along cultural lines; conceptual learning differs from
associative learning in the greater amount of transformation of information
required.
Indications of more specific differences in information processing
orientations also exist. Several studies have found that cultures which
promote rigid, parental control tend to produce adults with less differen-
tiated cognitive systems (Witkin, 1967; Dawson, 1967). A person with a
relatively undifferentiated cognitive organization doesn't make fine dis-
tinctions among objects or use very many independent dimensions in making
judgments. Finally, Cole et al. (1971) report several studies indicating
an apparent cultural difference in the ease with which disjunctive or con-
junctive judgment rules are applied. (A disjunctive rule says, in effect,
that an object belongs to such-and-such a class if it possesses either at-
tribute A or attribute B; a conjunctive rule says that it must possess both
attributes A and B simultaneously to qualify) . Liberian tribesman seemed to
have less difficulty handling disjunctive rules than American subjects who
have repeatedly shown a preference for conjunctive rules.
Overview
This review seems to suggest that members of disadvantaged subcultures
(or "primitive" cultures) may systematically differ from other consumers in
•1
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their collection, organization, and integration of information relevant
to exchange relationships. Members of such subcultures may tend to pro-
ject planning only over short periods, weigh immediate rewards/penalties
very heavily, make impulsive choices, focus on concrete evaluative attri-
butes, and make only gross discriminations among choice alternatives using
a very limited number of dimensions. However, the implications of this
review should be kept in proper perspective.
First, there are a number of consumer decisions which may be charac-
terized as "impulse" decisions regardless of the cultural heritage of the
individual making them. Thus, whatever differences we might expect to
observe regarding amount of prior planning or duration of judgmental input
should logically be restricted to certain types of decision^ i.e., those
not uniformly treated impulsively. The realm of expected differences is
thus bounded.
Second, it is far from clear that the portrait of the disadvantaged
consumer drawn above is not in fact a fairly accurate description of what
most consumers actually do in the majority of their decision episodes.
Slovic and his colleagues (Slovic, 1972; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971)
have marshalled intriguing evidence that humans in general tend to resort
to all sorts of simplifying tactics in making judgments. To the extent
that these simplifying strategies produce virtual equivalence between the
limited decision analysis characteristic of disadvantaged subcultures and
the analysis actually practiced (regardless of theoretical capacity) by
others, cross-cultural differences disappear from the scene. For example,
Slovic has proposed a general principle, based on a variety of research
It
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findings, which he labels "concreteness".
"Concreteness represents the general notion that a
judge or decision maker tends to use only the information
that is explicitly displayed in the stimulus object and
will use it only in the form in which it is displayed.
Information that has to be stored in memory, inferred from
the explicit display or transformed tends to be discounted
or ignored (Slovic, 1972, p. 14)".
Since Slovic 's research on which this proposition is based, draws
largely on the United States college population, it may well be that
reliance on concrete, observable, non-hypothetical information is quite
common, on a day-to-day decision making basis, across cultures. In
addition, the simplifying tendancies which humans in general display
should become even more pronounced when the decision environment is
characterized by a heavy information load: time pressures, distractions,
multiple alternatives, multiple cues per alternative. Consumers often
must operate in noisy, information-packed environments under some time
pressure. In nuch situations, cross-cultural differences on the dimensions
cited should also tend to disappear. Even the most abstract, complex
individual can be expected to react to such conditions by restricting his
attention to fewer dimensions or by using fewer category distinctions
(Wright, 1973).
A general rationale for the reluctance of most consumers to weight
long-run outcome dimensions very heavily in judging alternatives has also
appeared (Wright, 1972). This rationale is grounded in the disutility of
long-run dimensions as clear discriminators. The apparently trivial
FI
effect of long-run dimensions on eventual decisions is attributed to the
person's inability to reduce uncertainty about the status of the alter-
natives on that dimension, rather than to lack of concern over possible
long-run consequences. To the extent that such dimensions don't assist
the individual in escaping his conflict dilemma, they will be discounted.
Again, the urgent conditions of many decision environments would seem to
promote the use of short-sighted criteria, regardless of culturally-based
analytic capacities.
Thus, the conditions under which cross-cultural information handling
differences may emerge are, in reality, probably quite limited. Only
where the decision context encourages leisurely, extensive processing
about significant (meaningful differences; high investment) product areas
should we expect the differences suggested by the research reviewed to be
operative. We must also keep in mind just what the distinctions "primitive-
scientific" or "concrete-abstract" really mean when we interpret this body
of cross-cultural research. For example, in several discussions, cultures
are figuratively arrayed along some primitive-modern continuum. However,
the naivety of our intuitive ideas about where existing cultures might
lie along that theoretical continuum is highlighted by an illustration of
primitive (concrete) classification and modern (abstract) classification
supplied by Cole, et al. (1971) : "fruits and vegetables are classified
by the average shopper in ways quite different from those of the botanist
(p. 8)." In other words, they intend the term primitive to apply to the
"average shopper" who is our focal point.
I1
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Personality and Information Processing
Fatalism
In the context of this review, personality variables become rele-
vant only if (a) individual differences on the trait have been shown,
fortuitously, to coincide with cultural differences, and (b) if dif-
ferences on the trait have also been shown to relate to information pro-
cessing strategies. The characteristic way in vv^hich a person views him-
self vis-a-vis the external environment appears to be such a trait. This
general disposition has been given a variety of labels, including the
popular "alienation", "origin vs. pawn orientation" (deCharms , 1968),
fatalism (Nielsen, 1972), and "internal versus external locus of control"
(Rotter, 1966). Spawned by Rotter's development of the I-E scale to
measure this trait, an impressive body of research using a variety of
measuring instruments has been conducted over the last decade (Lefcourt,
1972) .
One consistent finding has been the characteristic level of "fatalism"
varies systematically across different subcultures. A highly fatalistic
individual assumes that his freedom to control his own fate is severely
limited. He expects that the rewards and penalties he receives are dic-
tated by forces in the external environment rather than by his own deci-
sions. Development of a highly fatalistic outlook appears to be a reason-
able adaptation to a lifestyle in which the person's observations tell him
repeatedly that his own decision-making bore no relationship to the out-
comes achieved. It is not surprising therefore that disadvantaged sub-
cultures have consistently been found to be significantly more fatalistic
II
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than others (e.g., Gruen and Ottinger, 1969; Hsieh, Shybut, and Lotsdorf,
1969; Lessing, 1969; Strickland, 1972; Zytkoskee, Strickland, and
Watson, 1971)
.
A number of studies have also demonstrated that differences in fa-
talism relate to differences in the V7ay information is collected and used
in making judgments; the implication is of course that these information
handling differences will apply to the cultural differences cited above.
The individual who does not believe he can control the outcomes he
achieves in apparently less attentive to information which might be rele-
vant to future decisions (Seeman and Evans, 1962; Seeman, 1963; Davis and
Phares, 1967; Lefcourt and Wine, 1969). His usage of information actually
gathered is not as efficient (Phares, 1968). The time he invests in
making a decision from assembled information is significantly shorter
than his less fatalistic peer on problems where skill is involved (Rotter
and Murray, 1965) . l-Jhen he does seek information relevant to a decision,
the high fatalist prefers secondary information filtered through others
to first hand experience, while the reverse seems true for the low fatalist
(Julian and Katz, 1968; Pines, 1973). In fact, the research on fatalism
concerning decision times and concern over failure dovetails nicely with
cross-cultural research by Kagan (1971) and Hess and Shipman (1965) noted
earlier.
Regarding information received from social sources, the high fatalist
appears less resistive to subtle persuasion attempts (Crowne and Liverant,
1963; Strickland, 1962; Getter, 1962) and more inclined toward a source
rather than a content orientation in analyzing new information. These
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findings taken together with the relative inattentiveness of the high
fatalist to new information are quite reminiscent of the accumulated
research on self-confidence and persuasibility (McGuire, 1968; Either
and Wright, 1973). The link between these two streams of research and
implications for cultural differences can profitably be pursued. A further
interesting insight is suggested by Brehm's (1966) reactance hypothesis.
Brehm proposed that V7hen a person's perceived freedom is threatened (as
by an attempt to persuade him in one direction) , a dramatic counterreaction
may occur. In such a case, the persuasive attempt may evoke a "boomerang"
effect in which the recipient actually moves away from the course advocated
in the message. But "boomerang" effects (in the reactance sense) would be
quite unlikely within a group of people who don't perceive that they really
have any meaningful freedom of choice to begin with (i.e., the high fa-
talists)
.
Nielsen (1972; 1973) has shown that certain types of message strategies
are particularly effective in influencing the high fatalist: (a) informa-
tion which spells out in detail exactly how an alternative can lead the
individual to attaining specific benefits (rather than leaving him to in-
fer the means-ends connection for himself) and information appealing to
his own short run self-interest (rather than long-run or societal interests)
Again, these findings dovetail with cross-cultural research. Several stu-
dies have reported that children from lower social classes are less adept
at causal (means-ends) analysis than middle class children (Hertzig, 1971;
Walker, Torrance, and Walker, 1971; Langgulung and Torrance, 1972).
Completing the information processing cycle, post-decisional handling

of information may also be related to a person's perception of how much
control he has over his destiny (and, consequently, to his cultural
background) . The unique aspect of post-decisional information processing
is of course the possibility that attempts to reduce dissonance will pro-
duce biases in the kinds of information attended to and cognitive reor-
ganization of prior information. Several studies (e.g.. Cooper, 1973)
have demonstrated, however, that perception of personal responsibility may
be a necessary condition for dissonance arousal. Since the high fatalist
does not see himself as a causal agent, he should tend not to feel per-
sonally responsible for his choices. Consequently, the types of informa-
tion handling activities vie associate with dissonance reduction may be
largely absent in certain subcultures.
Risk Taking
Several streams of research deal with the topic of risk-taking pro-
pensity on a cross-cultural basis. Risky-shift research has indirectly
provided some evidence that cultural differences in risk taking may exist.
One of the many hypotheses suggested to explain the shift toward ex-
tremity in objective risk-taking when social interaction occurs states
that risk taking may be more or less valued in a group as an activity unto
itself (Pruitt, 1971). Following up on this "risk is a value" hypothesis,
Kogan and Wallach "choice dilemma" problems, used extensively in risky-
shift research, have been administered in Nigeria (Carlson and Davis, 1971)
and Germany (Loman, Schrader, and Tromsdorf f , 1971) . The individual de-
cisions recorded by Nigerian subjects were significantly more conservative
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than the typical responses of American subjects, vjhile the German sample
was equally as risky as the Americans. Nigerian subjects also did not
view their peers as more cautious then themselves, in contrast to findings
V7ith American subjects. These findings seem to indicate that risk-taking
may be more or less valued in different cultures. However, as with all
"choice dilemmas" research, attributions of subjects' riskiness deal with
objective risk rather than perceived risk. Without subjective data about how
the different groups of subjects interpreted the possible consequences and
associated costs of the "choice dilemma" problems, conclusions about risk-
taking can be misleading.
Research on achievement motivation is also relevant to cross-cultural
risk taking propensities. McClelland (1961) drexi? on a diverse body of em-
pirical work in arguing that achievement motivation is a personality con-
struct which accounts for major differences between cultural groups. Risk
taking in an entrepreneurial sense was viewed as a necessary requirement
for technological development within a culture, and differences in develop-
ment and in scores on a variety of nAch measuring instruments were viewed
as substantiating the assertion of cross-cultural differences. The rela-
tionship of achievement motivation to willingness to take risks in skill-
oriented problem solving has also been demonstrated (Atkinson, 1964) , al-
though the relationship is not necessarily a simple one. To the extent
that this work is valid, the implication is that the risk analysis pro-
cesses employed by cultural groups whose family and religious traditions
induce indifference to achievement will differ systematically from those
where achievement is viewed as highly important. Presumably, the difference
I
is not in the process itself (at least little evidence exists to suggest
this) but either in the vjay nAch interacts x;ith estimated probabilities
of success and incentive values of success (see Atkinson, 1957) , or in
the relative importance attributed to. these latter two factors by
different groups.
Loose characterizations of different cultural groups as risky and
conservative in their decision strategies should be avoided. First, the
McClelland 's cross cultural comparisons can be challenged on methodological
grounds. Levine (1973), for example, expresses concern over lack of face
validity and concurrent validity in the measuring instruments used.
Second, existing research relies heavily on the perspective of the re-
searcher to establish v^hat is or is not risky behavior. Since different
cultures may interpret situations differently or have different preferred
modes for expressing riskiness, we must be cautious of equating avoidance
of risk "as I see it" with avoidance of risk "as he sees it". Third, many
of the results from studies on nAch and on locus of control seem to comple-
ment each other. However, nAch deals only with competitive situations;
locus of control is not as restricted operationally (deCharms, 1968).
Locus of control, moreover, is not really a very precise concept; surely
the differences between a highly fatalistic individual who sees (a) a ran-
dom universe, (b) a benevolent Diety, or (c) a diabolical Diety as con-
trolling his destiny may be relevant to decison-making strategies. Thus
the general pattern of similar results from research on these two pan-
cultural personality traits probably does not allow us much confidence in
our ability to make precise cultural predictions about decision-making
processes
.

L'valuative Criteria
Perceptual dimensions
What effect might cultural differences have on an individual's
perceptual sensitivity to different dimensions of products? These
aspects of the environment on which a person focuses attention in
recognizing and classifying objects presumably bear close corres-
pondence to the dimensions which remain salient as he evaluates those
objects. Reviews by Triandis (1954) and Tajfel (1959) suggest there
is only modest evidence that perceptual phenomena relate predictably
to cultural contexts.
The unique physical environment occupied by groups defined as
culturally distinct may affect their perceptual sensitivity in several
ways. Tajfel (1959) suggests "functional salience" as a label for
those cases where "the physical ecology of the environment, and the
conditions of survival related to it , are responsible for some
variability in the degree of close inspection that human groups under-
take of various aspects of their physical surroundings (p. 379)."
In other words , where an individual perceives the costs of mispercep-
tion to be quite high (lethal) he becomes acutely alert, and the natural
ecology surrounding him systematically biases the dangers to survival
with which he must cope. Studies of visual illusion and binocular
rivalry also provide some evidence that cultural differences in informa-
tional sensitivity can be attributed to differences in prior familiarity
with human artifacts different shapes, objects, contours, etc.
Finally, following Tajfel* s taxonomy, language systems may bias the
perceptual dimensions selected for attention.

In a slightly different vein, where modal norms clearly exist
within a culture suggesting that certain outcomes are to be valued more
than others , individuals may conform to these and be quite attentive
to those outcome dimensions. The extent to which cultural norms will
influence selective perception is undoubtedly influenced by the
host of factors prominent in small group research: cohesiveness
within the cultural unit, degree of privacy surrounding the judgmental
task, ambiguity of the individual's own experiences, etc.
Affective-meaning systems
Work by Osgood and his associates indicates that the three major
factors of semantic space (evaluation, potency, activity) are pan-
cultural (Osgood, 1965; Tanaka, Oyama, and Osgood, 1953; Osgood, 1965;
Tanaka and Osgood, 1965; Tanaka, 1967; Tanaka, 1972). Thus, the
affective-meaning systems employed by people in diverse cultures are
virtually equivalent at the most basic level. However, evaluative
criteria may be culturally unique in the sense that the factor loadings
of individual semantic scales may differ somevrhat from culture to
culture, even to the point that a dimension of meaning may load on
one factor in one culture and a different factor in another culture
(Tanaka, 1971). Additionally, and unsurprisingly, the directionality
of the evaluations given concepts may differ substantially across
cultures. For example, Tanaka (1972) reports that, in the domain of
time-related concepts, there was high similarity of evaluative direc-
tion among high-school students from 15 different countries in
the domain of time-related concepts ; the Korean sample showed the only
I
substantive divergence. But variation across cultures v;as much more
promounced in the domain of racial evaluations , regional evaluations
,
or socioeconomic concept evaluations. And discovery of universality
in the evaluation of such concepts as democracy, competition, or
wealth does not mean, of course, that these concepts necessarily
connote the same things in different cultures.
Szalay and Bryson (1973) measured three aspects of affective
space on which cultural groups might be expected to differ: the similarity
of meanings given to concepts , ordering of priorities regarding the
concepts, and patterns of relatedness among the concepts. They found
that the cognitive distance between their black and white American
samples was slightly greater across problem domains than that between
white student and white workers (American), while the Korean-American
divergence was substantially greater.
The assumption that a common culture produces some degree of
homiogeneity in the value systems of group members is common among
anthropologists and sociologists, and the hypothesis is so intuitively
appealing it almost deserves to be true . Some troublesome questions do
arise, however, when research on cross-cultural value systems is attempted:
when cultures are differentiated on the basis of easily observable
demographic variables, as is common, over how wide a range of concept
domains does affective homogeneity really exist? how large is the
variation within groups defined in this manner compared to variation
between groups? is whatever homogeneity exists confined to very broad
sorts of priorities with priorities regarding the realm of individually
purchased goods and services quite heterogeneous? and finally, what
i
research problems arise in trying to construct profiles of culturally
distinct evaluative systems? What little evidence we have so far does
not permit any generalizations about cultural differences in the content
of long-term memory, nor any conclusions about vrhether such generaliza-
tions can ever emerge
.
Considerable research effort has already been expended in trying
to use convenient demographic distinctions in identifying segments of
individuals with common perceptual schemes and priorities in the domain
of products and services. These analyses have been quite discouraging.
Clusterings based on similarity of evaluative space usually cut across
demographic or cultural lines or subdivide within "cultures". This body
of research seems to argue that such clusterings can and should be
discovered without prior reference to demographic differences.
The work reviewed regarding cultural differences in decision pro-
cesses, abstract means-ends analysis, differentiation, etc. seems to be
fairly well rooted in inductive theoretical analysis. It is in this
area of the content of evaluative systems that cross-cultural research
seems to become virtually theoretical. Why do we suspect that those
groups we point to as "cultures" will show homogeneity in the content
aspects of judgment? Because they seem to have shared a more-or-less
similar life experience. What is it about their life experience which
makes us think we should discover similarities? In most cases, this
stage in the theoretical reasoning is sidestepped. How little similarity
do we tolerate before we give up on labeling a grouping as a "culture"?
Should we conclude that any grouping of individuals v;hich yields substantive

similarities in category content and priority systems indicates that the
group qualifies as a "subculture"? Is alot of demographic similarity
and a little cognitive content similarity more meaningful than vice-versa?
Or does the motion of culture still make sense
,
given the speed v;ith
which sociological and technological change moves to reduce yesterday's
"obvious" cultural differences and to redistribute individuals among
different "subcultures"?
In part the problem is one of description. Many analytic approaches
have been employed in trying to catalogue cultural value profiles. In
part the problem is one of purpose. That is, we can go on describing
differences in the perceptual and evaluative content of "cultural"
groups defined in various ways ad infinitumi. If our goal is the creation
of goods and services bundles ideally tailored to the desires of these
groups , then the descriptive catalogue m.ay be seen as a sufficient end
unto itself. But there must be some attempt to tie these descriptions
back to shared heritage and experience if the concept of "culture" is
to have theoretical im.portance.
The descriptive problem itself is troublesome. At one extreme
we find the traditional approach in which the researcher accepts the
demographic distinction as his starting point and relies heavily on his
ovm intuitive insight to characterize the perceptual/affective space of
a "culture". In many cases the researcher has himself been a member of
the culture he is trying to define ; in most cases he is at least biased
by his a priori acceptance of the demographically based boundary line.
Two exam.ples of intuitive value profiles found in the consumer research
I4
literature may serve to illustrate the problems of such analyses
.
Among the eight values that Engel, Kollat , and Blackwell (1958) suggest
as characterizing American culture are religious ity, conforrnity
,
security, and leisure. Hov; likely is it that an alternate interpre-
tation of America 'a brief history and of the divergent experiences
of the last several decades would produce a profile containing opposite
values? And if religious ity implies allegiance to the Puritan ethic,
isn't there a problem of internal consistency if leisure is also to
be a dominant value? Dubois (1972) suggests that the French culture
may be described as valuing both individuality and nationalism, as
valuing individual freedom and being highly fatalistic, as valuing both
logical thinking and artistic sensualism. Either internal consistency
is again a problem or the diversity within France is so great that
talking of a unified French culture loses meaning. (In all fairness,
dictating this profile was not Dubois' major objective.)
Cross cultural researchers frequently attempt an "ethnographic"
analysis to discover the real category- content systems existing v/ithin
a group (Frake, 1962). Such analysis is basically qualitative and
entails close observation of everyday life-style and discussion with
group members. Hage (1972) presents an illustration of the approach
relevant to consumer analysis . He was attempting to characterize the
content of the category systems used by Munich , Germany natives in
the domain of beer-drinking. What emerges is akin to the market grid
types of analyses often presented in basic marketing management courses
to illustrate in a folksy v;ay how a segmentation hypothesis might

logically be created. Ethnographic analysis thus seems relevant as a
first step in research on affective-meaning systems , a step which should
precede, or at least accompany, analysis of measured responses via
powerful scaling or clustering statistical routines. Triandis and
his associates (Triandis and Malpass , 1970; Triandis, Vassilou, Tanaka,
and Shanmugam, 1972) suggest an imaginative potpourri of methods for
making observations of overt behaviors and eliciting subjective verbal
responses as fodder in the development of cultural category profiles
.
This work also demonstrates how such an initially qualitative approach
can eventually culminate in rigorous statistical analysis. If mul-
tivariate scaling and clustering routines are to be applied in cross-
cultural research, the necessity of prior ethnographic analysis seems
extremely crucial in order that outputs can be interpreted. A good
example of this , in addition to the work cited above , is a study of
Liberian culture in which an exhaustive attempt to identify the kinds
of everyday activities and contexts people were familiar with preceded
application of hierarchical clustering of free-response data to compare
category sortings (Cole, Gay, Click and Sharp, 1971).
Overview
Differences in the final decisions consumers make may be traced
either to differences in the judgmental strategies brought to bear on
the task or to the evaluative content of criteria which they applied.
Thus individuals with identical perceptions and priorities may reach
different decisions because their respective paths of analysis differed,
II
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or individuals using identical processes may reach different conclusions
because of differences in valuation systems. To K-hat extent does this
review indicate that cultural similarity leads to homogeneity in either
judgmental process or in affective criteria?
There seems little reason to suspect that the basic sorts of
information processing activities contributing to consumer decision
analysis will differ across cultures. There is, however, considerable
evidence that cultural differences in the execution of these basic
processes may exist. In particular, cultures we describe as disad-
vantaged appear to promote less abstraction
,
greater concern over
short-run outcomes, impulsivity, lower inclination toward spontaneous
means-ends analysis, less active information search, and less differen-
tiation in classifying things. Newell and Simon (1972) assert that
culture plays a role in information processing only through its
influence on the content of long term memory. This position seems
to be partially belied by some of the evidence reviewed. On the other
hand, Newell and Simon interpret their work on problem, solving and
inference processes (which has not rigorously explored cultural or
even individual differences) as showing the dominance of the task
environment in shaping the decision strategy applied. One major
question v/hich may be raised is whether the differences in judgmental
strategy which research shows could exist will actually manifest
them.selves over a large portion of everyday consumer decision tasks.
The task environment may quite often overwhelm cultural differences.

Cross cultural research on information processing skills has been
criticized on several grounds including the i-^esearcher's relative ig-
norance of language, and the different motivations of different sub-
cultures regarding participation in research tasks . Perhaps the most
damaging criticism, however, refers to failure to give sufficient
attention to the influence of the situational context. Cole and Bruner
(1971) remind us that formal equivalence of experimental operations
cannot be assumed to insure actual equivalence of the task environment
from the perspectives of different subcultural groups , and that we have
little knovrledge of how representative different task environments are
within the experience of different groups. (Ignorance of the situational
context of consumer decision making and the effect of task factors on
this process is not confined to cross-cultural research.) Although
some of the work com.paring the retail structures serving middle class
and ghetto residents is suggestive (e.g., Alexis, 1972; Sturdivant , 1973),
more rigorous analysis of the structure of the decision environment
facing different cultures should prove quite useful.
The question of the status (and future) of the hypothesis that
membership in a culture produces relative homogeneity in the content of
individual value systems is difficult to answer right now. We arrive
back at what is, in the author's view, the core problem of cross
cultural research: how do we operationally define a culture? Tradi-
tionally, cross-cultural research proceeds by defining distinct "cultural"
groups using such dimensions as physical proximity, language similarity,
and/or some combination of demographic characteristics. Once defined,
differences in affective systems or perceptual systems m.ay be sought.

Thus we define tv;o segments of people who show v;ithin-group homogeneity
in category content and in their priorities v/ithin a conceptual domain
as culturally distinct only if these two groups also fall neatly into
place along easily observable demographic lines . However , it seems
the concept of "cultures" loses all meaning unless these differences
in evaluative space actually do exist. That is, there is really no
such thing as a "culture" unless the grouping in question does indeed
have a degree of commonality in evaluative viewpoint.
Does our operational definition stress demographic similarity and
use that as a starting point for seeking evaluative similarity? Or do
we recognize evaluative similarity as the necessary ingredient? If so,
should we search initially for evaluative similarities and then try to
trace backwards in search of some dimensions of common experience?
Where do we stop segmenting into subcultures?
In summary J a reasonable conclusion may be that cross-cultural
comparisons related to the judgmental process of consumers have a
future, especially if the representativeness and the interpretation
of the judgmental task environment are systematically considered.
On a more pessimistic note, the future of cross cultural comparisons
related to the content of evaluative criteria used by consumers is
ambiguous. Granted that differences in choice patterns cannot be fully
understood without av^areness of the underlying value systems of the
decision makers , it is nevertheless unclear how descriptions of these
value systems on a cultural level will ever be woven into explanatory
consum.er theory.
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